



# **CAM network code development - Stakeholder Joint Working Session 4 -**

**ENTSO-G material**

Brussels – 19<sup>th</sup> May 2011

# Part 1


## Opening and introduction

# SJWS 4 – Opening and Introduction

## CAM concepts to be discussed

- ERGEG's CAM framework guideline is basis for ENTSOG concepts

#	Date	Remarks	Topic to be tackled
1	6 <sup>th</sup> April 2011	SJWS 1	Bundling and platforms
2	21 <sup>st</sup> April 2011	SJWS 2	Auctions
3	4 <sup>th</sup> May 2011	SJWS 3	Within-day allocation and interruptible capacity
4	19 <sup>th</sup> May 2011	SJWS 4	Wrap-up



## SJWS 4

- Wrapping-up, further debating and concluding the past three SJWSs
- Challenging process to conduct in very limited time
  - All material to be published after the session

# SJWS 4 – Opening and Introduction

➔ ENTSOG highly appreciates the engagement of all involved parties

## Inter-dependencies

- Discussions showed the strong interlink of other areas
  - CMP / Tariffs / Balancing / Interoperability
  - Newly introduced inter-dependencies may require code adaptations

## Parallel discussions on CAM

- Possible content changes possible (announced by ERGEG)
  - ACER CAM FG consultation / Sunset Clause / Target Model

In case different measures are introduced code work needs to be reviewed (planning and timing)

# SJWS 4 – Opening and Introduction

## ENTSOG's approach for the draft Network Code

ENTSOG is currently developing the draft  
→ SJWSs' conclusions already reflected

- Draft will be consulted as of June 21<sup>st</sup>
- Stakeholder session to present the draft Network Code
- PLAIN Network Code will be accompanied by a Consultation Document outlining:
  - Code text
  - Rationale
  - Explanations
  - Questions and considerations for further progress
  - Issues to be further investigated within ENTSOG

# SJWS 4 – Opening and Introduction


## Agenda

No.	Description	Time
2.	CAM NC development process – European Commission	10.45-11.00
3.	ACER – insight on tariff development	11.00-11.15
4.	Platforms and bundling – NC consequences	11.15-12.00
6.	Auction design – NC consequences	12.15-13.00
	<b>Lunch Break</b>	<b>13.15-14.00</b>
8.	Within-day and interruptible – NC consequences	14.00-14.45
10.	Prime Movers' conclusions from the SJWSs	15.00-15.30
11.	Outlook for the NC	15.45-16.00

# Part 2

## Platforms and bundling – NC consequences

# Summary of bundling concept





# Summary of bundling concept

## Key characteristics of concept

- Capacity (bundled service) request via one joint auction
  - Same level of capacity allocated on both sides – no stranded capacity
- Uniform nomination resulting in no flange trading (respecting ERGEG's framework guideline)
- Developed with focus on user needs: coordinated capacity, timing, type, etc.
- Feasible model fully coordinated via two contracts (invoices etc.)
- Avoids: tax issues, liability questions, legal issues, complexity

# Conclusion of debate on bundling concept

## Main points of discussion

- ENTSOG model describes the sale of capacity available on both sides
  - Differences of capacity level during the transition phase remaining at both sides treated via: smeared forward to short term / recycled as interruptible / re-localised to other IPs / sold as unbundled
- Interest for one single nomination managed by the TSOs highlighted (recognising existing unbundled products during transition)
- Interest for ENTSOG providing a list of relevant virt. IPs requested
- Two-contract model allows for progressive implementation while limiting complexity associated with a single contractual framework

• Preference raised to allow market to choose where to trade gas (bundling as an option)

• Great concerns raised on obligation to offer exclusive bundled products (sunset clause under discussion)

- → ENTSOG has to take an assumption

# Further development on bundling – handling differences in technical firm

## Possible principles

- Smear forward to short term
- Recycled as interruptible
- Re-localised to other IPs
- **Sold as unbundled**

- According to regulation, TSOs must offer all available capacity
- Therefore ENTSOG will allow for firm capacity to be sold as unbundled on one side of the border


# Further development on bundling - nominations

## Flow nomination principle

- Current nomination systems still necessary due to:
  - Interruptible capacity is sold unbundled
  - Extra technical firm on one side is sold unbundled
  - Existing contracts remain unbundled in the interim (sunset clause)
- Therefore two nomination principles are needed:

- Adjacent TSOs shall develop a nomination principle, where nominations are sent via a single message
  - Requires the development of new data formats
- Current nomination systems must be maintained

# Summary of booking platforms



# Summary of booking platforms

## Key characteristics of concepts

- Different platform approaches described
  - Start: platforms for each TSO/country/IP
  - End: common European platform
- Reducing platforms along with the development
- Market demand should drive the decision
- Facilitates bundling and joint allocation methods/procedure at borders
- Promotes cooperation of adjacent TSOs
- Development /or decision on /of platform option/step should focus on need to have and based on cost/benefit

# Conclusion of debate on booking platforms

## Main points of discussion

- Recognition of complexity, required time and challenge to set-up a pan-European Platform
  - EU platform preferred over managing numerous IP-specific solutions
  - Trade-off to be solved between early implementation of harmonised auctions and pan-European platform development

### Complexity to establish a common approach recognised

- Standardised procedures/front-office is a must-have
  - Anyhow, NC focuses on standardisation of commercial aspects
- Interest raised on the harmonisation of back-office matters (as subsequent steps)

Commission, ACER, MSs, market and ENTSOG to work together

# ENTSOG platform dilemma

## Two directions to proceed

- Either:
  - Work directly towards a common European platform

Dilemma: a European platform will take long time to develop, but FG requires immediate development on market design, because bundling requires a joint platform

- Or:
  - First develop a number of platforms before reaching a common platform

Dilemma: opening and closing x number of platforms, before reaching end solution



# Part 3

## Auction design – NC consequences

# Standard products

	Type of Auction		Possible Maximum "Service Duration"	Standard Capacity Product	Share of total calculated capacity
Long Term	Alt 1	Annual Quarterly Auctions	From 1 Quarter up to [60] consecutive Quarters	Quarterly	Maximum 90% of calculated available long-term firm capacity
	<del>Alt 2</del>	<del>Annual Yearly Auctions</del>	<del>From 1 Year up to [15] consecutive Years</del>	<del>Yearly</del>	<del>Maximum 90% of calculated available long-term firm capacity</del>
	<del>Alt 3</del>	<del>Annual Quarterly &amp; Yearly Auctions</del>	<del>From 1 Quarter up to [15] consecutive Years</del>	<del>Quarterly + Yearly</del>	<del>Maximum 90% of calculated available long-term firm capacity</del>
Short Term	Annual Monthly Auctions		From 1 Month up to 12 consecutive Months	Monthly	Total calculated available short term firm <sup>13</sup> capacity minus allocated quantities from previous firm auctions
	Rolling Monthly (Month-Ahead) Auctions		One month	Monthly	Total calculated available short term firm capacity minus allocated quantities from previous firm auctions plus any surrendered capacity
	Rolling Daily Day-Ahead Auctions		One day	Daily	Total calculated available short term capacity minus allocated quantities from previous firm auctions
	Within-day <sup>14</sup>		Remainder of the day	Daily (or balance of day)	Any remaining available capacity

The 60 consecutive quarterly products will be auctioned simultaneously to offer long-term capacity.

The draft Network Code will focus on the option favoured during SJWS 2


# Auction calendar

## European-wide Auction Calendar

- Details the timing of all auctions run within a year
- Published end of January (every year)
- Invitation ahead of auctions
  - Long-term: one month
  - Annual monthly: one month
  - Rolling monthly: one week

Auctions will take place at the same time throughout Europe

# Bidding window and auction process



# Bidding window and auction process

## Key characteristics

- Sealed-Bid Auction
  - Relevant Information published before the auction
  - Bids are submitted throughout the bidding window
  - Aggregated market information provision
- Any unsold capacity is rolled over to next shorter duration

A simple and consistent design shall drive the auction process

# Early views – Volume based design

- TSO provides a range of prices
- Starting reserve price (P0;reg. Tariff) up to 30 price steps
- Shippers may submit 1 sealed bid for each price step
- First price step at which total demand is lower or equal to supply defines clearing-price

$$P_{i+1} = P_i + (x\% * P_0)$$

Available = 500 units

Price Steps	Ship1	Ship2	Ship3	Ship4	Ship5	Total
P30	0	0	200	0	0	200
...	...	...				
P6	0	0	200	0	0	200
P5	0	0	200	10	0	210
P4	50	0	200	25	0	275
P3	100	0	200	35	0	335
P2	100	0	200	50	250	600
P1	100	100	200	50	500	950
P0	100	100	200	50	500	950

A clear and consistent design shall drive the auction process

# Early views - Volume based design

## Price steps?

- Shippers submit their own price range
- TSO aggregates the price and quantity information

$P_{i+1} = P_i + (x\% * P_0)$       Available = 500 units

Price Steps	Ship1	Ship2	Ship3	Ship4	Ship5	Total
Px	0	0	200	0	0	200
...	...	...				
P6	0	0	200	0	0	200
P5	0	0	200	10	0	210
P4	50	0	200	25	0	275
P3	100	0	200	35	0	335
P2	100	0	200	50	250	600
P1	100	100	200	50	500	950
P0	100	100	200	50	500	950

A clear and consistent design shall drive the auction process

# Early views - Volume based design

$$P_{i+1} = P_i + (x\% * P_0)$$

Available = 600 units

## What if Demand > Offer at P30?

- Pro-rate bids at P30
- TSO to offer unlimited number of price steps (Px)
- Or work with several subsequent rounds

Price Steps	Ship1	Ship2	Ship3	Ship4	Ship5	Total
P30	0	0	200	0	0	200
...	...	...				
P6	0	0	200	0	0	200
P5	0	0	200	10	0	210
P4	50	0	200	25	0	275
P3	100	0	200	35	0	335
P2	100	0	200	50	250	600
P1	100	100	200	50	500	950
P0	100	100	200	50	500	950

A clear and consistent design shall drive the auction process



# Early views - Volume based design

$$P_{i+1} = P_i + (x\% * P_0)$$

Available = 500 units

## Clearing price

- Last price at which total demand is higher or equal to supply defines clearing-price?
- Would imply to pro-rate some bids / open additional round?

Price Steps	Ship1	Ship2	Ship3	Ship4	Ship5	Total
Px	0	0	200	0	0	200
...	...	...				
P6	0	0	200	0	0	200
P5	0	0	200	10	0	210
P4	50	0	200	25	0	275
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A clear and consistent design shall drive the auction process

# Bidding window and auction process

## Possible value discovery supportive measures

- A single round auction process with interim publication of relevant aggregated information
- Additional measures could be foreseen to meet the objective of reflecting actual demand from the beginning of auction
  - Obligation to bid from first day of the bidding window?
  - Restriction on placing and amending bids?
  - Early closure of the bidding window after a defined period of bid stability?

Measures are only needed to support bidding behavior

# Part 4

**Within-day and interruptible – NC consequences**

# Within-day options

## Key characteristics of concepts

- FCFS
  - Nominate over current booking
  - Early application gets allocated capacity (pay-as-used based)
- Auction
  - Place quantity and price
  - Users who signal price gets allocated capacity (open market based)

# Within-day options

## Main points of discussion

The auction option is preferred by majority of all parties

- Arguments:
  - Market-based approach, structured sale
  - Auction process perceived as complex, but manageable
  - Reserve price is key to develop a sustainable solution
  - Objective is to minimise over-and under-recovery and prevent cross-subsidy from base load to flexibility users
  - Extended bidding window (start d-1) to add flexibility
- Interrelation with CMP
  - Development of intra-day market through appropriate TSO incentives
  - Value of intra-day product dependent on flexibility to re-nominate

# Within-day options

## Main points of discussion

- Auction option preferred, but FCFS option prescribed by FG art. 2.2 and CMP GL art. 5
- If FCFS will be mandatory for within-day, then a simultaneous within-day auction??
  - the cost-benefit of applying both mechanisms in a workable way is questionable ??
- Both options will be consulted upon, but only one option can be included in the final ENTSOG NC

# Interruptible capacity

## Key characteristics of concept

- Same allocation process as firm
- Auction as the only allocation mechanism
- Reserve price to be the regulated tariff
- Co-ordination of calculation outcomes
- Harmonised interruption procedures, lead time and sequence

# Interruptible capacity

## Main points of discussion

- CAM FG changes value of interruptible capacity in general
- CMPs also impact on the value of existing interruptible contracts
- Probability of interruption will increase in the future
- Questions on long-term interruptible contracts to be dealt with under national law and regulation

Majority of users prefers firm capacity,  
but see a role for interruptible in the CAM NC



# Part 5

## Outlook on the Network Code

# Task

## Drafting a legal document

- CAM NC shall become an amendment to Chapter 2 of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 715/2009
- ENSTOG to develop proposal for Network Code on Capacity Allocation Mechanisms
- ENSTOG to detail the Framework Guideline provisions
  - Consulted upon
  - Submitted to ACER
- Without prejudice of outcome of Comitology procedure

# Approach

## Draft Network Code

- Plain text – legal proposal as applicable for a Regulation annex
  - Goal: Comprehensive NC with single option for each principle
- Assuming the document has passed Comitology

Goal is to present a final draft Network Code which could be easily considered directly by the EC

- Consultation Document to accompany the draft network code

Draft Network Code  
Structure



# Art 1 – Rationale

- **Subject Matter**
- **Introduction & “Whereas Clause”**
- **Definitions**
  - Meaning by 3<sup>rd</sup> Energy Package & catalogue of additional definitions
- **Legal disclaimer**
  - Public service obligations
  - Regulatory regime for cross border issues (Article 42 Directive 2009/73/EC) and responsibilities and powers of NRAs (Article 41 (6) Directive 2009/73/EC) subject to full harmonisation in NC
- **Equal treatment, non-discrimination and transparency**
- **Confidentiality**

## Art 2 – Application

- **Scope**
  - Cross border IPs, whether they are physical or virtual, between two or more MS / IPs between adjacent entry-exit-systems within the same MS, insofar as the points are subject to booking procedures by users
- **Capacity**
  - All existing capacity / capacity being made available, freed-up, etc.
- **Harmonisation**
  - Capacity products / capacity allocation / focus on firm capacity
- **Definition of standardised content**
  - Transportation contracts and general terms and conditions
  - Implementation requirements

# Art 3 – Principles of Cooperation

- **Coordination of maintenance activities on IPs**
  - Rough description of coordination activities on Interconnection Points
- **Standardisation of communication**
  - Implementation of common communication procedures and data exchange
- **Capacity calculation and maximisation**
  - In accordance with Article 18 (3) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009

# **Art 4 – Allocation of firm capacity**

## **Art 5 – Cross-border services**

- **Allocation methodology**
- **Standard capacity products**
- **Applied booking unit**
- **Auction design**
- **Long term capacity auctions / Annual monthly / Rolling monthly / Daily capacity auction**
- **Auction algorithm**
  
- **Bundled services**

# **Art 6 – Interruptible capacity**

## **Art 7 – Within-day services / allocation**

- **Allocation of interruptible capacity**
- **Standardised interruption lead times**
- **Coordination of interruption process**
- **Defined sequences of interruptions**
  
- **Within-day firm allocations (via auctions)**



# Art 8 - Tariff

## Art 9 – Booking platforms

- **Tariff**
  - Reserve price
  - Split of auction revenues from bundled products
- **Booking platform**
  - Primary and secondary capacity
  - Interim steps and timetable
  - Action plan and timetable

# Part 6

**Final summing up and conclusion**

# Overall – SJWS Conclusions

## General

- ENTSOG's SJWS process supported by the stakeholders
- Special thanks for the Prime Movers' contributions
- ENTSOG is pleased with the input received from stakeholders
  - Allows us to describe the preferred views and make the draft code a workable/comprehensive document

Numerous preferences are considered in the draft code

- The draft code will be plain legal text (single options for all aspects)
  - Supported by a Consultation Document
- Stakeholders request highest possible level of harmonisation
- Code modification to be elaborated upon

# Overall – SJWS Conclusions

## Tariffs

- Clarity on the distribution of long vs. short term tariffication yet to be provided
  - ACER discusses “Zero Reserve Price” as an option

Draft NC based upon the assumption that  
Reserve Price = Regulated Tariff

## Booking platforms

- Dilemma of user request for (only) one EU Platform requiring time to implement and ad-hoc implementation of bundled capacity acknowledged

Consensus: step-by-step approach from IP to EU platform(s)  
while starting work on target as soon as possible

# Overall – SJWS Conclusions

## Bundling

- Stakeholders support ENTSOG’s bundling concept
- Capacity stemming from technical differences (+ capacity from old contracts and interruptible capacity) is sold as un-bundled capacity
- ENTSOG is investigating technical issues that must be addressed in order to develop a single nomination procedure for cross-border capacity
  - To take account of the interim period (split contracts) and to allow selling unbundled capacity (e.g. interruptible) separated nominations will also be possible
- In the Study and the Impact Assessment on the “Sunset Clause”, ACER will provide an analysis of the legal basis on which TSOs could force users to give up a part of their capacity and at the same time force others to take that share (without opening the validity of the contract)

Stakeholders oppose compulsory Bundling

# Overall – SJWS Conclusions

## Auction design

- Quarters still widely supported
- Auction Calendar supported by the market
- Proposed volume-based approach supported
  - ENTSOG presented new ideas
  - ENTSOG will draft a market-based approach that will be subject to consultation following publication of the draft NC
  - ENTSOG welcomes any comments stakeholders can make on this, including the questions that ENTSOG raised in the presentation
- Detailed design of NC supported to give sufficient stability
- Incremental capacity to be considered

A consistent auction process needs clarity and transparency to be rolled out all over Europe!

# Overall – SJWS Conclusions


## Within-day allocation

- Auctions broadly supported
  - FCFS option included in the consultation document
- TSOs should be incentivised to offer additional firm capacity beyond current Regulation

## Interruptible capacity

- ENTSOG approach supported
  - Following similar design as firm auction process
- Future role of interruptible capacity unclear
- Reserve Price = Price at a proportion of the regulated firm tariff

# Project Schedule



today







# ENTSOG

