Network Code Capacity Allocation Mechanisms

Recap on NC proposed Auction principles

Brussels – 20th July 2011



Harmonized auction design = the same all over Europe

 Same auction design shall apply – auctions shall be held simultaneously for all bundled products on concerned IPs



10% of available capacity to be reserved for Short Term auctions

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Standard Capacity Products = small set of fixed durations & start

	ту	pe of Auction	Possible Maximum "Service Duration"	Standard Capacity Product	Share of total calculated capacity
E	Alt 1	Annual Quarterly Auctions	From 1 Quarter up to [60] consecutive Quarters	Quarterly	Maximum 90% of calculated available long-term firm capacity
ong Tern	Alt 2	Annual Yearly Auctions	From 1 Year up to [15] consecutive Years	Yearly	Maximum 90% of calculated available long-term firm capacity
	Alt 3	Annual Quarterly & Yearly Auctions	From 1 Quarter up to [15] consecutive Years	Quarterly + Yearly	Maximum 90% of calculated available long-term firm capacity
	Annua Auctic	nl Monthly Nons	From 1 Month up to 12 consecutive Months	Monthly	Total calculated available short term firm ¹³ capacity minus allocated quantities from previous firm auctions
ort Term	Rolling (Mont Auctic	g Monthly h-Ahead) ons	One month	Monthly	Total calculated available short term firm capacity minus allocated quantities from previous firm auctions plus any surrendered capacity
Sho	Rolling Daily Day-Ahead Auctions		One day	Daily	Total calculated available short term capacity minus allocated quantities from previous firm auctions
	Withir	n-day ¹⁴	Remainder of the day	Daily (or balance of day)	Any remaining available capacity

Combining products = Independent auctions envisaged

- All IPs auctioned at the same moment
- Up to 60 quarters auctioned
- No link between
 - Subsequent products
 - Related IPs
- To secure capacity over routes/ longer time, NC allows adjustment of bids
 - information will be published each day



- SCP = Standard Capacity Product
 - B = Bidding Window for the individual bid
 - A = Allocation of each Standard Capacity Product

EU-wide Auction Calendar



Cleared-price, single round methodology

- Volume-based cleared-price algorithm proposed for long term, annual monthly and rolling monthly:
 - \circ $\,$ compatible with incremental and has practical advantages $\,$
 - Price steps will need to be set carefully to minimise unsold capacity and need for pro rating
- Uniform-price algorithm for day-ahead and within-day:
 - Included as workable approach for short term



Volume-Based Cleared-Price auction algorithm



Volume-Based Cleared-Price auction algorithm

without obligation



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Uniform-Price auction algorithm

Day-ahead auction: 500 units available

- Day-ahead and
- Within-day

Users can submit up to 10 independent bids. The price may be chosen freely and there are no pre-specified price steps. Bids are <u>additive</u>.



Thank you!

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Network Code Capacity Allocation Mechanisms

Explanation of auction game

Brussels – 20th July 2011



Auction game assumptions



- Three entry-exit systems, two unidirectional IPs
- Firm bundled capacity sold at A \rightarrow B and B \rightarrow C



Auction game assumptions

In real life	For today's game
Around 150 IPs	Two unidirectional IPs
60 consecutive quarterly products auctioned	Four consecutive quarterly products auctioned
10 day bidding window	Three 'day' bidding window
30 price steps	10 price steps
Bidders can specify minimum quantity	Minimum quantity assumed to be zero
Many shippers	Eight shippers, each with a different business scenario



Auction game assumptions

- No capacity has been sold already at these IPs
- Reserve price (=regulated tariff) and price steps are pre-set
- For now we focus just on the mechanism for this one auction
 - ignore the secondary market and later auctions
 - in real life these will play a very important role



Business scenarios

- Each team will be given an envelope
- In the envelope is a business scenario
- Your scenario will determine:
 - How much capacity you will need to try and buy
 - Where you need to buy it (A \rightarrow B, B \rightarrow C, or both?)
 - When you need to buy it (which quarters?); and
 - How much you are allowed to spend

Your job is to meet the aims of the business scenario and to keep within your budget constraints!



The game

Bidding rules

- You can't bid for more than the total capacity available (indicated on each sheet)
- Your bid at each price step must be equal to or lower than your bid at the next lowest price step
- If you don't want to bid, please enter 0



The game

The Excel spreadsheet



Day 1 (25 minutes)

				<u>Shipper 1</u> Capacity bids
Quarter 1	P ₉	4.19	€	
Total	P ₈	4.08	€	
capacity	P ₇	3.97	€	
,	P ₆	3.86	€	
600,000	P ₅	3.75	€	
	P ₄	3.64	€	
	P ₃	3.53	€	
ALC: N	P ₂	3.42	€	
同時時代に	P ₁	3.31	€	
	Po	3.20	€	

				<u>Shipper 2</u>
				Capacity bids
Quarter 1	P 9	4.19	€	
Total	P ₈	4.08	€	
available capacity	P ₇	3.97	€	
	P ₆	3.86	€	
600,000	P ₅	3.75	€	
	P ₄	3.64	€	
	P ₃	3.53	€	
	P ₂	3.42	€	
	P ₁	3.31	€	
	P.	3 20	£	



Day 1 (25 minutes)

			<u>Shipper 1</u> Capacity bids
Quarter 1	P 9	4.19 €	100,000
Total	P ₈	4.08 €	100,000
capacity	P ₇	3.97 €	100,000
	P ₆	3.86 €	100,000
600,000	P ₅	3.75 €	100,000
	P ₄	3.64 €	100,000
	P ₃	3.53 €	100,000
	P ₂	3.42 €	200,000
	P ₁	3.31 €	300,000
	Po	3.20 €	400,000

				Capacity bids
Quarter 1	P ₉	4.19	€	300,000
Total	P ₈	4.08	€	300,000
available capacity	P ₇	3.97	€	300,000
	P ₆	3.86	€	300,000
600,000	P ₅	3.75	€	300,000
	P ₄	3.64	€	300,000
	P ₃	3.53	€	300,000
	P ₂	3.42	€	300,000
	P ₁	3.31	€	300,000
	Po	3.20	€	300,000

Shipper 2



Day 1: interim results

То

• Clearing price = P1 if the auction closed now

1.115.8	Qu	arter	
	1		Total
	P 9	4.19 €	400,000
	P ₈	4.08 €	400,000
	P ₇	3.97 €	400,000
	P ₆	3.86 €	400,000
4	P ₅	3.75 €	400,000
	P ₄	3.64 €	400,000
	P ₃	3.53 €	400,000
	P ₂	3.42 €	500,000
	P ₁	3.31 €	600,000
	P ₀	3.20 €	700,000
tal ava	ilabl	e capacity	600,000

Bundled capacity A-B





Day 2 (10 minutes): interim results

- Clearing price = P9 if the auction closed now
 - pro rata allocation would be needed

	1-						
	Qua	arter					
	1		Total				
	P ₉	4.19	€	800,000			
	P ₈	4.08	€	800,000			
	P ₇	3.97	€	800,000			
	P ₆	3.86	€	800,000			
	P ₅	3.75	€	800,000			
	P ₄	3.64	€	800,000			
	P ₃	3.53	€	800,000			
	P ₂	3.42	€	800,000			
	P ₁	3.31	€	800,000			
	P ₀	3.20	€	800,000			
Total ava	Total available capacity						

Bundled capacity A-B



Day 3 (15 minutes): final results

• Clearing price = P0

To

	Quarter Total 1 Total P9 4.19 € 0 P8 4.08 € 0 P7 3.97 € 0 P6 3.86 € 0 P5 3.75 € 0 P4 3.64 € 100,000 P2 3.42 € 300,000 P1 3.31 € 400,000 P0 3.20 € 500,000					
	Qua	arter				
	1		Total			
	P ₉	4.19	€	0		
-	P ₈	4.08	€	0		
	P ₇	3.97	€	0		
	P ₆	3.86	€	0		
	P ₅	3.75	€	0		
	P ₄	3.64	€	100,000		
	P ₃	3.53	€	200,000		
	P ₂	3.42	€	300,000		
	P ₁	3.31	€	400,000		
	P ₀	3.20	€	500,000		
tal ava	ilable	e capaci	ity	600,000		

Bundled capacity A-B





Individual allocations after day 1

Individual allocation t	able: shippe	<u>er 1</u>						
		Input	Input			Taking Pro-rat	a at P9	into acco
Product	Quarter	СР	Total Demand	Price	Bid Qty	Allocated Qty	Cost	
Bundled capacity A-B	Quarter 1	P1	600,000	3.31	300000	300000	€	993,000
Bundled capacity A-B	Quarter 2	PO		1.5	0	0	€	-
Bundled capacity A-B	Quarter 3	PO		1.5	0	0	€	-
Bundled capacity A-B	Quarter 4	PO		2.9	0	0	€	-
Bundled capacity B-C	Quarter 1	PO		3.5	0	0	€	-
Bundled capacity B-C	Quarter 2	PO		1.7	0	0	€	-
Bundled capacity B-C	Quarter 3	PO		1.5	0	0	€	-
Bundled capacity B-C	Quarter 4	PO		3.2	0	0	€	-
						Total	€	993,000

The game

To help the game run smoothly...

- Remember:
 - A bid at one price step must be lower than or equal to the bid at the next lowest price step
 - You can't bid for more than the total capacity available
- Please stick to the time limit
- Save your bids on to a USB stick at the end of each round and bring them up to the front

Each team has an ENTSOG facilitator to help explain the game and to answer any questions about auctions that you may have - Please use them!



The game

Team feedback

- Please pick a spokesperson for your team who will talk about your experiences after lunch
- Please write your thoughts on the paper provided:
 - What was your bidding strategy?
 - Did your team achieve its aims?
 - What went well for you and what didn't go so well, and why?
 - Which parts of the auction design worked well?
 - Which parts of the auction design would you change, and how?

We want your views!



Thank you We hope you enjoy the game!

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