entsog
european network
of transmission system operators
for gas

ENTSOG
SUMMER SUPPLY OUTLOOK

2025

WITH WINTER 2025/26 OVERVIEW

Contents

Executive Summary

In line with Art. 26(3)(g) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1789, ENTSOG has undertaken an assessment of the European gas network for the upcoming summer (1 April 2025 to 30 September 2025). Reaching adequate filling level in the European gas storage facilities at the end of the summer season is essential to ensure security of supply in the winter. Therefore, the analysis investigates the possible evolution of the gas supply as well as the ability of the gas infrastructures to meet the demand, exports, and the storage injection needs during summer 2025.

Furthermore, following the interest expressed by institutions and stakeholders, ENTSOG has run an overview analysis for the winter 2025/26 season. The analysis investigates the possible evolution of supplies and UGS inventory along the next winter season as well as the ability of the gas infrastructure to meet the demand under different conditions. Winter preparedness is repeatedly one of the most important topics being discussed by energy stakeholders and following findings of previous analyses it needs to be considered as early as possible.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine raises energy security concerns in Europe. Therefore, ENTSOG additionally assessed the dependence of the EU on the Russian supply during summer 2025 and winter 2025/26. Exports to Ukraine and Moldova are considered in the simulations.

The increased role of gas supply in the form of LNG to Europe was also assessed through different scenarios of LNG availability. In addition to the reference scenario, which is based on historical data, sensitivity analyses were conducted for both low and high LNG availability scenarios.

Summer Supply Outlook 2025 with Winter 2025/26 overview main findings:

- On 1 April 2025, the EU gas stock level is lower than in the previous two years (at the same time as the pre-energy crisis average levels), at 34%, with 388 TWh/~ 35 bcm. The colder weather (closer to average winter conditions) during the 2024/25 winter season, along with the expiration of the transit contract between Ukraine and Russia in December 2024, and high gas prices, contributed to the extensive use of storage facilities in Europe.

- To replenish gas storage in preparation for the upcoming winter, Europe will require a higher volume of LNG compared to the previous summers (as approx. 631 TWh/~57 bcm of gas needs to be injected in EU storage to reach 90%). Existing European gas infrastructure and newly commissioned projects, including LNG terminals, are boosting import capacity and flexibility, enabling greater LNG inflows and more efficient cooperation among Member States, thereby strengthening energy

security in the EU. However, under specific circumstances, some possible supply limitations and bottlenecks may occur.

Summer Outlook 2025 – different scenarios (1 April to 30 September 2025)

- The European gas network can enable market participants to reach 90% stock level in all underground gas storage facilities by the end of the summer season 2025 in the reference demand scenario (based on demand estimates provided by TSOs for the summer season 2025). The injection period prolonged until November 2025, along with higher LNG supply, can provide greater flexibility to fill storage in preparation for the next winter season. Nevertheless, considering the storage levels at the beginning of the injection season and the significant gas withdrawal during the previous winter – from 95% stock level down to 34% (approx. 706 TWh/~ 64 bcm was withdrawn from EU storage during winter season 2024/25) – **it is essential to start gas storage replenishment as early as possible.** Any unplanned maintenance could potentially put additional pressure on the refilling season.
- The demand side response (either policy-based or price-based) will provide flexibility in reducing pressure on LNG imports. However, it will still require relatively high LNG volumes, and it remains essential to start the filling season as early as possible.
- In case of full Russian pipeline disruption, the simulations show that either higher LNG supply (approx. an additional 57 TWh/~5 bcm to EU) and extended injection period to November 2025 or demand side response (either policy-based or price-based) would be needed to reach 90% storage level instead of the projected 85%.
- Additional sensitivity simulations were performed with assumed limited availability of LNG. Low LNG supply sensitivity is limited to 778 TWh /~71 bcm of natural gas in the form of LNG available for Europe during summer season 2025, representing the lack of possibility to replace Russian LNG with other sources. In this case storage levels would reach only 78% by the end of September 2025. However, with some demand side response (approx. 136 TWh/~12 bcm; either policy-based or price-based) and extended injection period to November 2025, it would be possible to reach 90% storage level in the EU. The results indicate the importance of securing an adequate level of LNG supplies to Europe.
- Combination of investigated sensitivities underlines the importance of securing an adequate supply to Europe and starting injection to European storage as early as possible.

Winter 2025/26 overview – different scenarios (1 April 2025 to 31 March 2026)

- To investigate whether the transmission and import infrastructure enables the demand and to assess if the ability to store gas during the winter period is not limited

or deteriorating, the maximum storage target levels were set at the end of winter 2025/26 overview simulations. This should not be interpreted as a recommendation to enforce equally ambitious storage levels at the end of the winter but rather as an evaluation of the situation during the winter season, particularly in the case of high demand events.

- Starting from a stock level of 34% on 1 April 2025, the injection and withdrawal capacities of the gas storage facilities, combined with the supply flexibility of imports, is sufficient to cover the demand (in reference demand scenario) and reach the inventory target level of 53% at the end of winter across the EU. This demonstrates adequate infrastructure and supply flexibility for the upcoming summer 2025 and winter 2025/26 seasons under condition that adequate supplies would be secured.
- In the case of a full disruption of Russian pipeline supplies, storage facilities are sufficient to meet demand and achieve an average inventory target level of 35% across the EU. However, in the case of high demand (similar to the five-year average demand of the winters 2017-2021) combined with a full disruption of Russian pipeline supply, storage levels by the end of winter 2025/26 would be fully depleted. Nonetheless, the simulation results show that maintaining a sufficient storage level at the beginning of the 2025/26 winter season, coupled with demand response (either policy-based or price-based) and additional LNG supply, could mitigate risks during the winter allowing to end withdrawal season above 30%.
- The low LNG supply sensitivity analysis indicates the importance of securing an adequate level of LNG supplies to Europe. Otherwise demand response (either policy-based or price-based) would be necessary to prevent full depletion of storage by the end of the 2025/26 winter season. This underscores the need for Europe to secure a sufficient supply of LNG.
- Additional 10 bcm of storage offered for the European market in Ukraine could contribute to demand satisfaction and optimise usage of the other European storages. Ukraine storages offered to the EU market corresponds to an additional approx. 10% of total working gas volumes located in the EU.
- More scenarios for winter demand profiles, along with high-demand cases such as a 2-week cold spell or peak day demand, will be investigated in the upcoming Winter Outlook, as in previous editions.

Conclusions

- The gas infrastructure, including new projects commissioned last year, allows for efficient filling of EU storages up to 90% in preparation for the winter. A higher LNG supply than ever delivered to EU may be necessary to fill storages and prepare for winter, considering storage levels at the beginning of summer season 2025.
- Securing additional volumes of gas may be necessary to replace Russian pipeline supply particularly in South-Eastern Europe.
- Storage plays an essential role to ensure security of supply, providing seasonal flexibility needed during the winter season. Storage is ensuring 31%[1] of the supply during the previous winter season 2024/25. Too low storage levels and early significant withdrawal from storage facilities will result in low storage levels at the end of the winter season. This might have a negative impact on the flexibility of the gas system. From the security of supply perspective, it would be important to **inject gas during the summer season and keep storage at an adequate level until the end of the winter**. However, some European countries are reserving a part of their own gas stock, constituted as strategic reserves, and using only for the purpose of mitigating demand curtailment. The availability of strategic storage reserves is depending on the country's specific regulation.
- Sensitivities performed to understand the consequence of different potential supply limitations and storage levels show that injection should start as early as possible.
- In case of full disruption of Russian pipeline supplies, in case of high demand (similar to the five-year average demand of the winters 2017-2021/22), additional measures might be needed to save adequate volumes of gas for the end of the winter 2025/26 season.
- A scenario where the availability of LNG to Europe is significantly limited (Low LNG Scenario) shows the importance for securing adequate supplies to avoid risk of insufficient storage levels by the end of the 2025/26 winter season. This situation can be improved further by a demand side response (as a result of market behaviour reduction due to high prices or policy-based demand measures).
- EU storage stock level on 1 April 2025 is at 34%. EU storage facilities allow to store an additional 744 TWh/~68 bcm when filled to 100%. Additional storage flexibility could be secured by storing additional volumes in Ukrainian storage facilities, with 10 bcm available, under a condition that this gas could be injected and later withdrawn during the winter season, and that market participants would be willing to use it. Potential transit of gas through Ukraine between Member States could improve interconnectivity between the CEE and SEE regions.

[1] Based on the data from the ENTSOG Gas Flow Dashboard: https://gasdashboard.entsog.eu/#map-flows

Important:

ENTSOG's Summer Supply Outlook 2025 with Winter 2025/26 overview is an assessment of the readiness of the gas infrastructure to cope with the upcoming summer and winter seasons under different scenarios, but this assessment is not a forecast of the expected gas supply situation and actual availability of gas from different sources is not guaranteed. The actual utilisation of the gas infrastructure, including the development of the gas storage levels, will be determined by the decisions of the market participants and influenced by external factors such as policy decisions.

Outlooks are not forecasts of the future. Rather, they identify potential resource adequacy risks at a specific point in time for the upcoming season which can be addressed proactively with preparation or mitigation measures. The identified risks are based on the assessment of a reference scenario and of various sensitivities, which consider uncertainties that could materialise.

1. INTRODUCTION

The Summer Supply Outlook 2025 with Winter 2025/26 overview aims at assessing the ability of the European gas infrastructure to provide sufficient flexibility to shippers during the storage injection season and enough flexibility to meet different demand situations during the storage withdrawal season.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine raises energy security concerns in Europe. Therefore, ENTSOG additionally assessed the dependence of the EU on the Russian supply during summer 2025 and winter 2025/26. Ukraine and Moldova are included in the modelling perimeter, with exports to both countries considered in the simulations. Given that the transit contract between Ukraine and Russia expired in December 2024, the Summer Supply Outlook 2025 with Winter 2025/26 overview also includes the gas demand on the left bank of the Dniester River in Moldova. The transit of EU gas through Ukraine (considering technical firm capacities available) can be utilized by EU shippers. Furthermore, ENTSOG has enhanced its model and topology to assess the potential for additional seasonal flexibility provided by Ukrainian storage facilities, with up to 10 bcm available for EU shippers, based on information from Ukraine's TSO.

The increased role of gas supply in the form of LNG to Europe was also assessed through different scenarios of LNG availability. In addition to the reference scenario, which is based on historical data, sensitivity analyses were conducted for both low and high LNG availability scenarios.

2. ASSUMPTIONS

The Summer Supply Outlook 2025 with Winter 2025/26 overview is based on assumptions specific to the upcoming summer and winter seasons and short-term trends, as detailed in the annexes. In any case, the actual injection, withdrawal, and supply mix will result from market behaviour and other external factors such as policy decisions.

Storage behaviour in the modelling is defined as follows:

- The actual gas storage level at the beginning of April 2025 is set according to the AGSI+ platform. The target level is 90% to be reached at the end of injection season (Summer Supply Outlook 2025) and is defined for each storage facility. This target is not mandatory, i.e. the storage level goes below 90% if other supply sources otherwise cannot satisfy demand.

- The target level for the withdrawal season (Winter 2025/26 overview) is to reach the maximum storage level for each storage facility. The target is not mandatory, i.e. the storage level goes below it if other supply sources otherwise cannot satisfy demand. This assumption with maximum storage target levels were set to investigate whether the transmission and import infrastructure allows to satisfy the demand and also to assess whether the ability to store gas during the winter period is not limited or deteriorating. It should not be interpreted

as a recommendation to enforce equally ambitious storage levels at the end of the winter but rather as an evaluation of the situation during the winter season, particularly in the case of high demand events.

- The Ukraine Storage node is modelled as a last resort one – this means it is only filled after all the other EU storages are meeting the established target.

- The model assumes cooperative behaviour among Member States as well as LNG distribution to terminals and storage utilisation according to security of supply needs. However, the model does not factorize commercial supply agreements.

- Finally, some EU countries could be reserving a part of their own gas stock constituted as strategic reserves to be used only for the purpose of satisfying their own demand. The model assumes the actual constraints on the utilization of the strategic storages and reserves[2]. Therefore, these strategic storage facilities cannot be depleted to avoid/reduce demand curtailment.

2.1. Infrastructure

A significant number of new gas infrastructure projects have been commissioned in the past year, boosting energy security in the EU. The main infrastructure commissioned has been the new LNG and FSRU terminals in Germany, France and Italy, the new IP Kalotina between Bulgaria and Serbia and the IP Strandzha flow direction upgrade from Turkey to Bulgaria.

The topology of the network model considers the existing European gas infrastructure, new upcoming projects like the enhanced capacity in Moffat entry to Ireland, the internal network investment in Zeebrugge Belgian Area, the new LNG terminals in Germany (Wilhelmshaven) and Italy (Ravenna), the LNG capacity upgrade in Poland (Swinoujscie) and all the firm technical capacities provided by TSOs, which include maintenance plans known during the data collection released on January 2025.

Additionally, taking into account the transit contract between Ukraine and Russia expired in December 2024 and that the EU shippers can store gas in Ukraine (which can return to EU or even flow to Moldova), the Outlook now includes the total demand of Moldova and the transit of EU gas through UA (considering technical firm capacities available) together with a storage node of 10 bcm to be used by EU shippers.

In order to capture the influence of the UGS inventory level on the injection and withdrawal capacities, ENTSOG has used the injection and deliverability curves made available by GIE. These curves represent a weighted average of the facilities (salt caverns, aquifers or depleted fields) of each area (see **Annex A**).

[2] The methodology used for strategic reserves and strategic storage facilities is explained in the Annex A

2.2. Demand

The Summer, Yearly and Winter simulations consider Reference demand as well as the average historical demand of the five years from 2017 to 2021/22 and its reduction by 15% in the spirit of the coordinated demand reduction measures defined in the Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1369 of 5 August 2022. The 5-years average demand values have been adapted for the simulations in this report to consider the latest market conversions from L-gas to H-gas in Germany, France, and Belgium. An average daily demand has been considered for each month (see **Annex B** for country details).



Figure 1 - Forecast Summer 2025 (GWh/d)

For comparison purposes, **Figure 1** shows the European aggregated daily demand for the Summer 2025 compared to the historical daily demand over the last five summers. Despite the slight increase forecasted, demand is expected to be in line with the average of the last five summer seasons.



Figure 2 - Forecast Winter 2025/26 (GWh/d)

Three different demand scenarios were considered for the Summer Supply Outlook 2025 with Winter 2025/26 overview. Reference Demand, 5-years average for the years (2017-2021/22) and 5-years average for the years (2017-2021/22) minus 15%. The **Figure 3** summarizes the demand for all countries for each scenario used in the Summer and Winter season simulations.



Figure 3 - Demand Summer 2025 and Winter 2025/26

2.3. Supply

The maximum supply potentials of the different sources providing gas to the EU (Caspian Sea, Algeria, Libya, Norway and Reference LNG) are based on the historical availability over the last five years or based on TSO information or the observed flows of the last year (Russia). Maintenance works on Norwegian gas fields is considered in the report in line with the published maintenance plan.

Supply limitations are set for different cases (monthly values for winter and summer seasons) so that the maximum flows from each source cannot exceed reasonable levels based on historical observations.

The Russian pipeline supply potential is limited to the flows through TurkStream. In order to assess the EU dependence on Russian gas, all simulations minimise the use of this supply source to the possible extent. Other supply sources are used therefore in priority. There is also a sensitivity assuming a total disruption of Russian pipeline supply.

For LNG, three different cases of supply availability are considered: (1) Reference LNG supply, (2) LNG supply, and (3) High LNG supply.

The maximum supply potential for seasonal assessments is by default (if not specified by TSOs or Russian pipeline supply or LNG sensitivity) calculated as the maximum 30-days rolling average supply from this source over the last five years per season. The Reference LNG supply case is calculated as explained above (maximum 30-days rolling average), while the Low LNG supply is reflecting a 20% LNG share limitation applied to the Reference LNG. Low LNG supply scenario is designed to simulate situation when, due to different possible reasons, LNG supply to Europe would be limited. The High LNG supply case is only limited by the European LNG terminal regasification capacities and TSO network capacities and not by the availability of importable LNG – answering question how much more LNG, thanks to existing infrastructure European gas system could intake.

GWh/day		Algeria	LNG	Low LNG	High LNG	Libya	Norway	Caspian
Summer Season	Max per 30 days	1155	5300	4250	9000	190	3800[3]	375
Winter Season	Max per 30 days	1220	5500	4400	9000	180	3800	390

Table 1 - Maximum supply potential [GWh/d]

The supply assumptions (supply potential) are based on the supply observed in the last five winter and summer periods and should not be considered as a forecast. The actual supply mix

[3] Supply potential is reduced some months according to maintenance plans.

will depend on market behaviour and other external factors. Moreover, the model does not factorize supply commercial agreements.

Regarding the European domestic production, **Figure 4** and **Figure 5** provide a comparison between the last five summer and winter seasons and the national production forecasted by the TSOs for summer 2025 and winter 2025/26. Domestic production is following a long-term dwindling trend, mainly due to the fall in production by the biggest gas producer in the EU, the Groningen gas field in the Netherlands which closed in April 2024. However, gas production in the United Kingdom rose in 2022 driven by a range of factors, including the start-up of new fields in the Southern North Sea. What is more, the Danish National Production is showing a significant growth thanks to Tyra offshore gas platform.

Domestic production in the summer 2025 is estimated to be very similar to the one from the previous summer, whereas for winter 2025/26 it is estimated to decrease by 7% compared to winter 2023/24.



Figure 4 - European national production comparison with Summer 2025 (forecast), TWh



Figure 5 - European national production comparison with Winter 2025/26 (forecast), TWh

Consideration of non-EU countries

When assessing the supply adequacy at European level, ENTSOG takes into account the interactions with the countries neighbouring the EU: the United Kingdom, Switzerland, North Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Ukraine, Turkey, and Moldova.

The analysis considers non-EU countries, including the Energy Community contracting parties, taking into account the geography and the actual supply situation:

- The United Kingdom, Switzerland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Serbia and Moldova are included in the modelling perimeter.
- Exports to Ukraine are based on the expected forecast provided by the Ukrainian TSO.
- Export to the Kaliningrad region of Russia is not considered.
- Export to Kingdom of Morocco is not considered.
- No export towards Turkey is considered. Caspian and Russian gas are transported through Turkey into the EU and additional gas imports from Turkey into the EU are allowed from Turkish LNG terminals.
- Albania, Montenegro and Kosovo are not connected to the gas grid.

2.4. Storage inventory



Figure 6 - Monthly UGS stock level development since 2020, %

On 1 April 2025, the EU gas stock level at the end of winter season is lower than in the previous two years (at the same time as the pre-energy crisis average levels), with 388 TWh (400 TWh including the UK), very far from the 669 TWh reached in 2024.

For the modelling of the different scenarios, Summer Supply Outlook 2025 considers the initial situation of the storage inventory level per country on 1 April 2025 as shown in the table of **Figure 7.**

In terms of absolute volumes in gas storage and considering the higher total capacity of storage in these countries, the largest volumes on 1 April 2025 are stored in Italy, Germany and Austria.

Country	WGV, GWh	Gas in storage	Full, %
Austria	101,587	43,591	42.9%
Belgium	8,410	3,353	39.9%
Bulgaria	5,911	2,011	34.0%
Croatia	4,774	441	9.2%
Czechia	44,432	15,182	34.2%
Denmark	9,790	3,300	33.7%
France	125,175	34,145	27.3%
Germany (H)	241,566	67,945	28.1%
Germany (L)	5,873	4,077	69.4%
Hungary	67,991	24,852	36.6%
Italy	202,085	85,903	42.5%
Latvia	25,000	9,275	37.1%
Netherlands	144,238	30,303	21.0%
Poland	37,493	16,012	42.7%
Portugal	3,570	2,969	83.2%
Romania	33,864	8,595	25.4%
Spain	35,832	22,665	63.3%
Slovakia	35,171	13,010	37.0%
Sweden	105	22	20.5%
Total	**1,132,867**	**387,651**	**34.2%**
Serbia	4,396	1,500	34%
Ukraine	106,400	0	0.0%
United Kingdom	35,000	11,921	34.1%



Figure 7 - Actual storage inventory levels on 1 April 2025 (for some countries, the initial level includes strategic stocks).[4]

In percentage comparison, the highest filling levels (more than 60%) are observed in Portugal and Spain; and the lowest (below 30%) are in Croatia, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Romania and Sweden. These storage levels per country have been used as a starting point for the Summer Supply Outlook 2025.

Some European countries reserving a part of their own gas stock constituted as strategic reserves to be used only for the purpose of mitigating demand curtailment. The model assumes actual strategic storage facilities constraints, but simulation results do not consider the utilization of strategic storage reserves. This means that strategic reserves remain available to reduce or even avoid demand curtailment in some countries. Availability of strategic storage reserves is depending on the country's specific regulation and more information about it for selected countries is aggregated in **Annex A**.

[4] The Working Gas Volume and the gas in storage for each country is based on the AGSI+ platform. For Serbia, the initial storage is considered 34% due to no availability of data.

3. MODELLING RESULTS FOR THE SUMMER SUPPLY OUTLOOK 2025

The following table shows the most relevant information concerning the Summer Supply Outlook 2025 results in the different demand scenarios in combination with the main assumptions possible configurations. The simulation results are explained onwards in this chapter.

Summer Outlook	Russian supply	Storage Target	LNG Scenario	Demand curtailment	Final UGS filling level *
Reference	Minimised	90%	Ref	No	90%
		90%	Low	No	78%
		Maximum	High	No	100%
	Disrupted	90%	Ref	No	85%
		90%	Low	No	69%
		Maximum	High	No	96%
5YA-15%	Minimised	90%	Ref	No	90%
		90%	Low	No	86%
		Maximum	High	No	100%
	Disrupted	90%	Ref	No	90%
		90%	Low	No	76%
		Maximum	High	No	100%
5YA	Minimised	90%	Ref	No	79%
		90%	Low	No	62%
		Maximum	High	No	98%
	Disrupted	90%	Ref	No	70%
		90%	Low	No	53%
		Maximum	High	No	94%

* Storage filling level on 2025 September 30

Table 2 – Summer Outlook Results Summary

3.1. Reference summer scenario - 90% storage target by 30 September 2025

For the Reference summer scenario, the overall summer season injection is defined as the amount of gas necessary to reach 90% of the stock level in each European storage facility on 30 September 2025 starting with total European stock level of 34% on 1 April 2025 (see **Figure 7**).

The distribution of injection and supply during the summer months results from the modelling and the following assumptions:

- The monthly gas demand estimated by TSOs (Reference)
- The monthly national gas production estimated by TSOs
- The monthly capacity provided by TSOs

- The storage injection capacities as defined in **Annex A**
- The flexibility given to the model for the definition of the supply potentials derives from the historical supply mix (see **Annex B**)

Based on these assumptions, the modelling has been used to check if any physical congestion or dependence on an import source may limit the injection.



Figure 8 – Reference summer scenario. Evolution of the aggregated European UGS stock level, %

The simulation shows that if there is no supply disruption[5], a 90% stock level can be achieved by 30 September 2025 for all storage facilities.

Table 3 shows the evolution of the stock level per country as result of the model for the Baseline Scenario.

[5] The pipeline supply from RU considers the option to flow through TurkStream

Country	01/04/2025	01/05/2025	01/06/2025	01/07/2025	01/08/2025	01/09/2025	01/10/2025
Austria	43%	47%	54%	63%	73%	83%	90%
Belgium	40%	40%	45%	56%	74%	85%	90%
Bulgaria	34%	34%	44%	55%	68%	81%	90%
Croatia	9%	18%	27%	40%	58%	75%	90%
Czechia	34%	39%	48%	58%	70%	81%	90%
Denmark	34%	34%	42%	54%	68%	81%	90%
France	27%	27%	36%	48%	64%	81%	90%
Germany	29%	30%	40%	53%	67%	80%	90%
Hungary	37%	43%	50%	58%	69%	80%	90%
Italy	43%	43%	52%	62%	70%	83%	90%
Latvia	37%	43%	59%	67%	73%	84%	90%
Poland	43%	44%	54%	65%	77%	86%	90%
Portugal	81%	81%	81%	81%	85%	90%	90%
Romania	25%	36%	47%	60%	69%	82%	90%
Serbia	34%	34%	44%	55%	68%	81%	90%
Slovakia	37%	45%	53%	62%	72%	82%	90%
Spain	63%	63%	66%	71%	79%	87%	90%
Sweden	21%	21%	21%	40%	70%	90%	90%
The Netherlands	21%	25%	35%	49%	64%	78%	90%
United Kingdom	34%	34%	34%	38%	67%	90%	90%

Table 3 - Reference Summer Scenario. Evolution of the aggregated UGS stock level per country[6]

The main finding of the Summer Supply Outlook 2025 for the Reference summer scenario is that the European gas network is capable of enabling market participants to reach 90% stock level in all underground gas storage facilities by the end of the summer season 2025. On the other hand, the results show that there is some supply flexibility to fill 37% of the Ukrainian storage offered to the EU market.

The results of the maximum storage target sensitivity analysis show that the flexibility of the gas system infrastructure is sufficient to achieve a higher storage filling level. In combination with the available supply assumptions (LNG Ref), storage levels can reach 95% by the end of September 2025 and 99% by the end of October 2025 (during the seven-month sensitivity injection period).

[6] This table shows one possible solution among many other feasible paths based on the defined assumptions. ENTSOG is not suggesting these values as the recommended trajectories of the filling levels.

Figure 9 shows the level and composition of the supply mix in the Reference summer scenario when the storage filling level at the end of September 2025 is 90%.[7]



Figure 9 - Reference summer scenario. Monthly supply mix, GWh/d

The monthly supply mix is stable over the summer season 2025 period. LNG supply and supply from Norway represent the largest sources of supply with 42% and 27% respectively. Pipeline gas supply from Russia accounts for 4% of the total supply and is limited by the firm capacity of the gas network.

[7] The import levels shown represent one possible supply option

3.2. Summer supply dependence assessment – supply disruption from Russia

This section investigates the potential impact of full disruption of the Russian supply during the injection period to reach 90% of the stock level in each EU storage facility on 30 September 2025, starting with total European stock level of 34% on 1 April 2025 (see **Figure 10**).

The distribution of injection and supply during the summer months results from the modelling and the following assumptions:

- The monthly gas demand estimated by TSOs (Reference)
- The monthly national gas production estimated by TSOs
- The monthly capacity provided by TSOs
- The storage injection capacities as defined in **Annex A**
- The flexibility given to the model for the definition of the supply potentials derives from the historical supply mix (see **Annex B**)

Based on these assumptions, the modelling has been used to check if any physical congestion or dependence on an import source may limit the injection. As no risk group is defined in regulation 1938/2017[8], all European countries cooperate as if they were part of a single European risk group.



Figure 10 – Reference summer supply dependence assessment. Evolution of the aggregated European UGS stock level, %

[8] Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010

In this scenario, EU countries storage levels can only reach 85% by the end of September 2025 and 88% by the end of October 2025 (during the seven-month sensitivity injection period).

Table 4 shows the evolution of the stock level per country as result of the model for the summer supply dependence assessment – supply disruption from RU. Results show that there is not enough supply flexibility for EU shippers to inject any gas in the Ukrainian storages.

Country	01/04/2025	01/05/2025	01/06/2025	01/07/2025	01/08/2025	01/09/2025	01/10/2025
Austria	43%	47%	53%	61%	70%	80%	85%
Belgium	40%	40%	48%	62%	90%	90%	90%
Bulgaria	34%	42%	49%	59%	67%	77%	84%
Croatia	9%	18%	25%	38%	56%	71%	84%
Czechia	34%	39%	47%	57%	67%	77%	85%
Denmark	34%	34%	42%	54%	68%	81%	90%
France	27%	27%	35%	48%	63%	80%	88%
Germany	29%	30%	39%	50%	63%	76%	84%
Hungary	37%	43%	50%	58%	67%	76%	83%
Italy	43%	43%	50%	59%	67%	79%	85%
Latvia	37%	43%	58%	64%	71%	81%	85%
Poland	43%	43%	52%	62%	74%	81%	85%
Portugal	81%	81%	81%	81%	83%	86%	86%
Romania	25%	35%	45%	56%	65%	76%	83%
Serbia	34%	41%	49%	58%	67%	76%	84%
Slovakia	37%	45%	52%	61%	71%	81%	88%
Spain	63%	63%	65%	70%	76%	83%	86%
Sweden	21%	21%	21%	39%	66%	84%	84%
The Netherlands	21%	21%	30%	44%	60%	75%	86%
United Kingdom	34%	34%	34%	34%	63%	86%	86%

Table 4 – Reference summer supply dependence assessment. Evolution of the aggregated UGS stock level per country[9]

Under the maximum target configuration, due to the lack of supply flexibility, all countries reach the exact same storage filling level of their working gas volume than in the baseline scenario in both six- and seven-months simulations. The European storage filling level could also increase up to an average of 88% during October 2025 as the injection season typically lasts until November 1 in some countries.

[9] This table shows one possible solution among many other feasible paths based on the defined assumptions. ENTSOG is not suggesting these values as the recommended trajectories of the filling levels.

Country	Value
Austria	85%
Belgium	90%
Bulgaria	84%
Croatia	84%
Czechia	85%
Denmark	90%
France	88%
Germany	84%
Hungary	83%
Italy	85%
Latvia	85%
Poland	85%
Portugal	86%
Romania	83%
Serbia	84%
Slovakia	88%
Spain	86%
Sweden	84%
The Netherlands	86%
United Kingdom	86%



Figure 11 - Russian Supply Disruption (Reference demand) – Storage % level

Only by increasing the LNG supplies above the Reference level (5,300 GWh/d) would give enough supply flexibility to reach targets over 90% in all storage facilities.

Figure 12 show the level and composition of the supply mix in the scenario the summer supply dependence assessment – supply disruption from Russia. According to the simulation results, the European storage filling level at the end of September 2025 is 85% with slightly different values across the countries from west to east.



Figure 12 – Russian Supply dependence assessment (Reference demand). Supply mix (GWh/d)

The monthly supply mix is stable over the summer season 2025 period. LNG and Norway represent the largest sources of supply, 43% and 28% respectively.

3.3. Summer supply dependence assessment under LNG Supply Sensitivities

For the Reference demand scenario without Russian supply, the impact of introducing the Low LNG sensitivity during summer is limiting the storage filling level at the end of September 2025 to 69% (and 69% also at the end of October 2025), with very similar results across all the different countries as shown in **Figure 13**.

Country	Value
Austria	69%
Belgium	72%
Bulgaria	68%
Croatia	68%
Czechia	69%
Denmark	72%
France	73%
Germany	68%
Hungary	68%
Italy	68%
Latvia	68%
Poland	68%
Portugal	69%
Romania	68%
Serbia	68%
Slovakia	71%
Spain	69%
Sweden	67%
The Netherlands	69%
United Kingdom	69%



Figure 13 – Russian Supply Disruption with Low LNG Supply (Reference demand) – Storage % level

Moreover, in Low LNG Supply and no Russian pipeline supply disruption together with the highest possible demand scenario (5-years average for the years 2017-2021/22) the storages can only reach 53% in September, in any case without any demand curtailment.

Without Russian pipeline supply gas, only a hypothetical High LNG Supply scenario would allow the storage to reach 90% or more under the reference demand scenario and the 5-years average demand 2017-2021/22 by the end of September.

Country	Value
Austria	87%
Belgium	90%
Bulgaria	84%
Croatia	84%
Czechia	85%
Denmark	90%
France	90%
Germany	90%
Hungary	83%
Italy	90%
Latvia	90%
Poland	90%
Portugal	90%
Romania	83%
Serbia	84%
Slovakia	88%
Spain	90%
Sweden	90%
The Netherlands	90%
United Kingdom	90%



Figure 14 - Russian Supply Disruption with High LNG Supply – Storage % level

Figure 14 shows how the High LNG supply sensitivity is not sufficient condition for the Western countries to cooperate more with some countries in Central and South-Eastern Europe in the absence of Russian gas. In this case the bottlenecks are identified from Germany and Italy to the east, and from Poland to the south.

4. MODELLING RESULTS FOR THE WINTER 2025/26 OVERVIEW

The following table shows the most relevant information concerning the Winter 2025/26 overview results, out of the yearly (12 months) simulations, in the different demand scenarios in combination with the main assumptions possible configurations. The simulation results are explained onwards in this chapter.

Winter Overview	Russian supply	Storage Target	LNG Scenario	Demand curtailment	Final UGS filling level *
Reference	Minimised	Maximum	Ref	No	53%
		Maximum	Low	No	19%
	Disrupted	Maximum	Ref	No	35%
		Maximum	Low	3%	11%
5YA-15%	Minimised	Maximum	Ref	No	74%
		Maximum	Low	No	43%
	Disrupted	Maximum	Ref	No	58%
		Maximum	Low	No	25%
5YA	Minimised	Maximum	Ref	No	12%
		Maximum	Low	8%	11%
	Disrupted	Maximum	Ref	4%	11%
		Maximum	Low	12%	11%

* Storage filling level on 2026 March 31

Table 5 – Winter Overview Results Summary

4.1. Reference winter scenario – maximum storage target by 31 March 2026

For the Reference Winter 2025/26 scenario, the overall winter season withdrawal is defined as the amount of gas necessary to meet demand and reach the maximum stock level in each European storage facility on 31 March 2026, starting with an average total European stock level of 34% on 1 April 2025. In this scenario the Reference demand, the 5-years average demand values[10] and the 5-years average demand values with 15% reduction for each country during the winter period were assumed.

The distribution of withdrawal, demand and supply during the winter months results from the modelling and the following assumptions:

- The monthly gas demand provided by TSOs and the 5-years (2017-2021/22) average monthly gas demand
- The monthly national gas production estimated by TSOs
- The monthly capacity provided by TSOs
- The storage withdrawal capacities as defined in **Annex A**

[10] Demand values have been updated for the simulations to reflect evolution of the conversion from L-gas to H-gas market (in Germany, France and Belgium)

- The flexibility given to the model for the definition of the supply potentials derives from the historical supply mix (see **Annex B**)



Figure 15 – Reference demand scenario. Winter evolution of the aggregated European UGS stock level, %

The Reference Winter 2025/26 scenario simulation results show that withdrawal capacities of the gas storage facilities combined with the supply flexibility of imports is sufficient to cover the demand and reach an inventory target level of 53% at the end of the winter in EU average. Also, according to the results of the simulation, the EU countries continue to inject more gas during October.

As also shown in **Figure 15,** the results in the yearly simulations are very exposed to the demand variations and the final storages level at the end of March can vary from 74% to 12%.



Figure 16 - Reference Winter demand scenario. Supply mix, (GWh/d)

Figure 16 shows the level and composition of the supply mix in the Reference Winter Scenario. The storage filling level at the end of March 2026 is 53%[11]. Russian pipeline gas supply is considered to reach this levels and LNG (41%) and Norway (27%) represent the largest sources of supply.

Starting from a stock level of 34% on 1 April 2025, the injection and withdrawal capacities of the gas storage facilities, combined with the supply flexibility of imports, is sufficient to cover the demand (in reference demand scenario) and reach the inventory target level of 53% at the end of winter across the EU. This demonstrates adequate infrastructure and supply flexibility for the upcoming summer 2025 and winter 2025/26 seasons under condition that adequate supplies would be secured.

[11] The import levels shown represent one possible supply option

4.2. Winter supply dependence assessment – supply disruption from Russia

This section investigates the potential impact of full disruption along the Russia supply routes during the withdrawal period to satisfy the demand and reach the maximum stock level in each European storage facility on 31 March 2026, starting with total European stock level of 34% on 1 April 2025. In this scenario the Reference demand, the 5-years average demand values[12] or the 5-years average demand values with 15% reduction for each country during the winter period were assumed.

The distribution of withdrawal, demand and supply during the winter months results from the modelling and the following assumptions:

- The 5-years average monthly gas demand and 5-years average monthly gas demand with 15% reduction
- The monthly national gas production estimated by TSOs
- The monthly capacity provided by TSOs
- The storage withdrawal capacities as defined in **Annex A**
- The flexibility given to the model for the definition of the supply potentials derives from the historical supply mix (see **Annex B**)

Based on these assumptions, the modelling has been used to check if any physical congestion or dependence on an import source may limit the fulfilment of gas demand during the withdrawal period. As no risk group is defined in regulation 1938/2017[13], all European countries cooperate as if they were part of a single European risk group.

[12] Demand values have been updated for the simulations to reflect evolution of the conversion from L-gas to H-gas market (in Germany, France and Belgium)

[13] Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010



Figure 17 - Supply dependence assessment. Winter evolution of the aggregated European UGS stock level, %

In the yearly simulations with reference demand values, in the case of full supply disruption from Russia, the storage facilities are used at their maximum to meet demand and can only stay at a 35% level maximum.



Figure 18 - Supply dependence assessment (Reference demand). Supply mix (GWh/d)

Figure 18 shows the level and composition of the supply mix in the Winter supply dependence assessment scenario with the reference demand. The storage filling level at the end of March 2026 is 35%. LNG and Norway represent the largest sources of supply in both cases.

In the highest demand scenario (5-years average), the storage facilities are used at their maximum and drop down to the 11% minimum average level.

Country	Curtailment Rate, %
Austria	4%
Belgium	4%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5%
Bulgaria	4%
Croatia	4%
Czechia	4%
Denmark	4%
Estonia	4%
Finland	4%
France	4%
Germany	4%
Greece	4%
Hungary	4%
Ireland	4%
Italy	4%
Latvia	4%
Lithuania	4%
Luxembourg	4%
Moldova	5%
North Macedonia	4%
Poland	4%
Portugal	4%
Romania	4%
Serbia	4%
Slovakia	4%
Slovenia	4%
Spain	4%
Sweden	4%
Switzerland	4%
The Netherlands	4%
United Kingdom	4%

Figure 19 - Russia Supply Disruption with 5-years average demand - Curtailment Rate

In addition to the 11% minimum EU average storages level at the end of the winter (only strategic volumes are not used), with the results also showing the need to have a demand response to reduce consumption by 4-5% or, otherwise a risk of 4-5% potential demand curtailment.

This risk must be anticipated if the EU countries are to reach the 90% target by the end of summer 2025 during the injection period. Only in case of 15% demand response, storage facilities can reach 58% of storage level in all countries.

4.3. Winter supply dependence assessment under LNG Supply Sensitivities

For the reference demand scenario without Russian supply, the impact of introducing the Low LNG sensitivity during winter is that the storage filling level results at the end of March 2026 fall from 35% (with reference LNG supply) to the minimum storage level of 11%, including a 3% impact on the demand side.

Low LNG supply results show the importance of securing an adequate level of LNG supplies to Europe. Otherwise, demand response (either policy-based or price-based) would be necessary to prevent from fully depleting storages by the end of the 2025/26 winter season, or even to mitigate the risk of demand curtailment in the event of a full disruption of Russian pipeline supplies, underscoring the need for Europe to secure a sufficient supply of LNG.

On the other hand, with the theoretical High LNG Supply sensitivity, which is close to the total EU regasification capacity, results show an average of 73% with very different filling levels per countries, as shown in the following **Figure 20**.

Country	Value
Austria	62%
Belgium	100%
Bulgaria	61%
Croatia	61%
Czechia	62%
Denmark	74%
France	99%
Germany	63%
Hungary	61%
Italy	61%
Latvia	100%
Poland	61%
Portugal	100%
Romania	61%
Serbia	61%
Slovakia	64%
Spain	100%
Sweden	69%
The Netherlands	97%
United Kingdom	97%



Figure 20 – Russian Supply Disruption with High LNG Supply (Reference Demand) – Storage % level

These results should be understood as a theoretical outcome that is only possible with the combination of some of the hypothetical assumptions that are design for this report in order to assess of the response of the gas infrastructure under different, like in the of unlimited LNG available.

Figure 21 shows how in the case of Low LNG Supply with no Russian pipeline supply and 5-years average demand the storages are also depleted down to 11% at the end of the winter (only strategic volumes are not used) together with the risk of having a higher demand curtailment.

Country	Curtailment Rate, %
Austria	12%
Belgium	12%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	12%
Bulgaria	12%
Croatia	12%
Czechia	12%
Denmark	12%
Estonia	12%
Finland	12%
France	12%
Germany	12%
Greece	12%
Hungary	12%
Ireland	12%
Italy	12%
Latvia	12%
Lithuania	12%
Luxembourg	12%
Moldova	12%
North Macedonia	12%
Poland	12%
Portugal	12%
Romania	12%
Serbia	12%
Slovakia	12%
Slovenia	12%
Spain	12%
Sweden	12%
Switzerland	12%
The Netherlands	12%
United Kingdom	12%



Figure 21 – Russian Supply Disruption with Low LNG Supply and 5-years average demand - Curtailment Rate

In this low LNG Supply sensitivity considering no Russian pipeline supply and the highest possible demand scenario (5-years average) the potential curtailment could reach, without any bottlenecks and a cooperative approach, a 12% of the demand across Europe.

Figure 22 shows how some European countries reserving a part of their own gas stock constituted as strategic reserves to be used only for the purpose of mitigating demand curtailment.

Country	Value
Austria	21%
Belgium	0%
Bulgaria	0%
Croatia	0%
Czechia	2%
Denmark	20%
France	0%
Germany	0%
Hungary	17%
Italy	25%
Latvia	7%
Poland	36%
Portugal	68%
Romania	0%
Serbia	0%
Slovakia	0%
Spain	55%
Sweden	0%
The Netherlands	0%
Ukraine	0%
United Kingdom	0%



Figure 22 – Storage fill-in level with Russian Supply Disruption and Low LNG Supply

The model assumes actual strategic storage facilities constraints, but simulation results do not consider the utilization of strategic storage reserves. This means that strategic reserves remain available to reduce or even avoid demand curtailment in some countries. Availability of strategic storage reserves is depending on the country's specific regulation and more information about it for selected countries is aggregated in **Annex A**.

The additional 10 bcm of storage in Ukraine available to the European market could contribute to demand satisfaction and optimise usage of the other European storages. Ukraine storages correspond to an additional approximate 10% of total working gas volumes located in the EU.

Legal Notice

The current analysis is developed specifically for this Summer Supply Outlook 2025 with Winter 2025/26 overview. It results from TSOs experience, ENTSOG modelling and supply assumptions and should not be considered as a forecast. The actual supply mix and storage level on 30 September 2025 and 31 March 2026 will depend on market behaviour and global factors.

ENTSOG has prepared this Summer Supply Outlook 2025 with Winter 2025/26 overview in good faith and has endeavoured to prepare this document in a manner which is, as far as reasonably possible, objective, using information collected and compiled by ENTSOG from its members and from stakeholders together with its own assumptions on the usage of the gas transmission system. While ENTSOG has not sought to mislead any person as to the contents of this document, readers should rely on their own information (and not on the information contained in this document) when determining their respective commercial positions. ENTSOG accepts no liability for any loss or damage incurred as a result of relying upon or using the information contained in this document.

ANNEXES

Annex A: UGS

The data for this Summer Supply Outlook 2025 with Winter 2025/26 overview is available online as an annex of this report. The data available is specifically:

- Working Gas Volume and Gas in storage on 1 April 2025.

For the modelling of the different scenarios, the Summer Supply Outlook 2025 considers the storage inventory level per country on 1 April 2025 as the initial situation. The gas in storage for each country is based on the AGSI+ platform. For Serbia, the initial storage is considered 34% due to non-availability of data. The relative filling level has been calculated using the Working Gas Volume and gas in the storage from the AGSI+ platform.

- Strategic storages and reserves

European countries that are reserving a part of their own gas stock as strategic in a specific gas storage or generally in form of strategic reserves. The availability of these strategic storages or reserves are depending on the country's specific regulation.

- Injection and withdrawal curves.

In order to capture the influence of UGS inventory level on the withdrawal capacity, ENTSOG has used the deliverability curves made available by GSE. These curves represent a weighted average of the facilities (salt caverns, aquifers or depleted fields) of each area.

Annex B: Demand, National Production, Supply Potential and Export

The data for this Summer Supply Outlook is available online as an annex of this report. The data for this Summer Supply Outlook 2025 with Winter 2025/26 overview is available online as an annex of this report. The data available is specifically:

- Average daily Reference Winter and Reference Summer demand forecast, GWh/d.

The Reference demand (from 1 April 2025 to 31 March 2026) is based on TSOs' estimates.

- Average daily 5YA demand and 5YA with -15% demand response forecast, GWh/d.

The 5YA demand (from 1 April 2025 to 31 March 2026) is based on 5-years average demand from 2017-2021/22 and 5YA -15% is considering a 15% demand reduction.

- Average daily National production forecast, GWh/d.

The national gas production estimated by TSOs

- Supply potential and exports to Ukraine

For each of the winter and summer demand profiles and high demand situations in the winter season, specific maximum gas supply availabilities are used in the report. The maximum supply potentials of the different sources providing gas to the EU are based on the historical availability over the last five years (Caspian Sea, Algeria, Reference LNG) or based on TSO information (Libya, Norway) or the observed flows of the last year (Russia).

Export to Ukraine is based on the expected forecast provided by the Ukrainian TSO.

Annex C: Modelling approach

The topology of the network model considers the existing European gas infrastructure, new upcoming projects, and the firm technical capacities provided by TSOs, which include maintenance plans.

ENTSOG is using Plexos modelling tool since spring 2021. The gas topology at European level and the Entsog model is modelling the European gas infrastructure with the most relevant accuracy. This enables the national assessment of relevant risks affecting the security of gas supply to benefit from the Union wide simulation of supply and infrastructure disruption scenarios and further extend the local assessment with a higher granularity.



Illustration 1: Entsog model overview

The cooperative modelling is done on the basis of an optimal crisis management. That is, in case a country faces a demand curtailment, all the other countries will cooperate in order to share the same ratio of demand curtailment.

Annex D: Curtailment Rate Results

The data for this Summer Supply Outlook is available online as an annex of this report. The data for this Summer Supply Outlook 2025 with Winter 2025/26 overview is available online as an annex of this report. The data available is specifically:

- Curtailment Rate for monthly simulations, %

For each demand situation and each zone, modelling results consist in the calculation of Curtailment Rate which is the potential level of demand curtailment representing the share of the gas demand that cannot be satisfied (calculated as a daily volume). The level of demand curtailment is assessed considering a cooperative behaviour between European countries in order to mitigate its relative impact. This means that all countries try to reduce the curtailment rate of other countries by sharing it.

Note: to give a comparable picture of the situation and avoid any distortion in the cooperative behaviour of ENTSOG's model, all indicators consider the demand as it is defined in the assumptions. However, in practice, a reduction of demand is observed in case of risk of inadequacy between supply and demand, generally as a consequence of increasing prices. This demand response to high prices is considered in the results (-15% demand reduction) and should be given due attention when interpreting the risk exposure to demand curtailment in the different countries. This is why an exposure to a few percentiles of demand curtailment observed in a country is generally considered as a limited risk in this assessment.

Abbreviations

TSO	Transmission System Operator
UGS	Underground Storage
LNG	Liquified Natural Gas
WGV	Working Gas Volume
UAe	Export to Ukraine

Supplies

CA	Caspian Area
DZ	Algeria
LY	Libya
NO	Norway
NP	National Production
RU	Russia

Countries

AT	Austria
BE	Belgium
BG	Bulgaria
CY	Cyprus
CZ	Czechia
DE	Germany
DK	Denmark
EE	Estonia
ES	Spain
FI	Finland
FR	France
GR	Greece
HR	Croatia
HU	Hungary
IE	Ireland
IT	Italy
LT	Lithuania
LU	Luxembourg
LV	Latvia
MD	Moldova
MK	North Macedonia
MT	Malta
NL	The Netherlands
PL	Poland
PT	Portugal
RO	Romania
RS	Serbia
SE	Sweden
SI	Slovenia
SK	Slovakia
UK	United Kingdom
UKn	Northern Ireland

Other

ATti	Austria Tirol
ATvo	Austria Vorarlberg
BEh	Belgium H-gas
BEl	Belgium L-gas
DEl	Germany L-gas
DEn	Germany THE South
DEg	Germany THE North
FRnL	French Nord L-gas
LNG_FRn	French LNG zone North
LNG_FRs	French LNG zone South
LNG_ITa	Italian LNG zone Adriatic
LNG_ESa	Spain LNG zone Atlantic
STcAT	Austrian storage zone
STcATm	Austrian multi-country storage zone
STcATn	Austrian storage zone connected to THE South
STcCZd	Czech storage zone connected to Slovakia
STcDE	Germany storage zone
STcDEd	Germany Dutch storage zone
STcDEdL	Germany Dutch storage zone L-gas
STcDEg	Germany storage zone connected to THE North
STcDEm	Germany multi-country storage zone
STcDEmL	Germany multi-country storage zone L-gas
STcDEn	Germany storage zone connected to THE South
STcFRa	Storage zone Atlantic
STcFRn	Storage zone North
STcFRnL	Storage zone North L-gas
STcFRs	Storage zone South
STcFRt	TSO Terega storage zone

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